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The rapid growth of 401(k) plans is one of the most striking trends in retire- 
ment saving during the last decade. These plans allow employees to defer in- 
come, to take advantage of generous employer matching provisions on some 
contributions, and to accumulate assets at the pretax rate of return. Strong em- 
ployee demand for 401(k) plans is undoubtedly part of  the explanation for their 
expansion during the 1980s. So too are various changes in the tax and regula- 
tory treatment of defined-benefit (DB) pension plans that were enacted in the 
1981 and  1984 tax reform bills and especially in the  1986 tax reform bill. 
These changes reduced employers’ willingness to provide DB plans for their 
employees and contributed to the growth of defined-contribution (DC) pension 
plans, including 401(k)s. 
A growing body of evidence suggests that 401(k) contributors do not offset 
their contributions by reducing their accumulation of  other financial assets (see 
Poterba, Venti, and Wise 1994, 1995). This does not necessarily mean that 
401  (k) contributions represent net additions to private saving, however, since 
they could be offset by reduced contributions to other pension plans. In partic- 
ular, if 401(k) plans have replaced other types of private pension arrangements, 
then their net effect on private saving may  be smaller than the contribution 
flow to these plans would otherwise suggest. 
To  investigate the degree of  substitution between 401(k) plans and other 
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employer-provided retirement saving arrangements, and to obtain firm-level 
information on these plans more generally, we  surveyed a stratified random 
sample of firms with 401(k) plans in 1987. We asked 401(k) plan administra- 
tors about the origins of their plan, in particular whether it replaced another 
pension plan for covered employees. We  also inquired about various detailed 
provisions of the plan, including participation rates, employer matching rules, 
loan and hardship withdrawal provisions, and whether the plan had been af- 
fected by antidiscrimination  rules. 
This paper, which summarizes the results from our survey, is divided into 
six  sections. Section 7.1  summarizes aggregate trends  in  contributions to 
401(k) plans and other employer-provided pension plans, and describes the 
changing institutional environment in which firms select DB and DC pension 
plans. Section 7.2 explains our sample survey design, and presents summary 
statistics on the set of 401(k) plans in our sample. Section 7.3 reports our find- 
ings on the interaction between 401(k) plans and other retirement plans. We 
find that 401(k) plans do not appear to have displaced previous DB plans for 
many workers, but that these plans did in many cases replace preexisting DC 
thrift and profit-sharing plans. 
The next two sections summarize the characteristics of 401(k) plans in our 
sample. Section 7.4 describes the pattern of participation rates and employer 
matching rates over time, and explores the links between these plan attributes. 
Section 7.5 explains the structure of  antidiscrimination rules, describes their 
changes over time, and summarizes their effects on the 401(k) plans in our 
sample. There is a brief conclusion. 
7.1  Trends in Defined-Benefit and Defined-Contribution  Pension Plans 
The 1980s witnessed a substantial change in the relative flows of contribu- 
tions to DB and DC pension plans. This was the result of at least two coincident 
developments. First, Bernheim and Shoven (1988) argue that high investment 
returns on existing DB plans reduced required contributions to DB plans in 
the mid-1980s. A second factor, explored in Chang (1991), Kruse (1995), and 
Silverman (1993), was the changing regulatory and tax environment in the 
1980s. 
The changing regulatory treatment of DB and DC pension plans began with 
the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).' ERISA 
imposed minimum plan standards for participation, vesting, and retirement, as 
well as requirements for funding past-service liability. It also established the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to insure pension benefits to 
employees in DB  plans, and financed this insurance program with taxes on 
existing plans. ERISA placed a lower regulatory burden on DC plans, which 
were  subject only  to  the  minimum plan  standards that  also affected DB 
plans. 
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Legislation since ERISA has raised PBGC premiums, required faster fund- 
ing of liabilities, and penalized employers for claiming excess assets of termi- 
nated DB plans. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility  Act of 1982  imposed 
faster vesting schedules  for lower-paid employees in so-called  top-heavy plans. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) imposed an excise tax of 10% on excess 
pension plan assets that revert to an employer upon termination of a pension 
plan. Subsequent legislation raised this tax to 20%, effective in 1990, and to 
50% if the employer does not transfer a portion of the excess assets to a re- 
placement plan, or increase benefits under the terminating plan. 
The 1987 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act increased the basic PBGC 
premium from $8.50 to $16.00 per participant, and added a variable premium 
that depends on the plan’s degree of underfunding. It also limited the tax deduc- 
tion for plan contributions to 150% of the plan’s termination liability; this had 
the effect of reducing employer contributions to DB plans (see Chang 1993). 
The net effect of these tax and regulatory changes has been a marked increase 
in the administrative cost, and a decrease in the benefits to employers from 
establishing DB pension plans. 
Table 7.1 reports the number of DC and DB pension plans, the number of 
participants in these plans, and the level of contributions to these plans from 
1975 to 1989.  The table shows that the number of DC plans more than doubled 
between 1975 and 1982, and then rose by 50% again between 1982 and 1989. 
The number of  DB  plans increased during 1975-82,  but  the increase was 
slower than that for DC plans. Between 1982 and 1989, however, the number 
of DB plans actually declined. The second column in table 7.1 shows the total 
number of participants in DB and DC plans, which includes both working and 
retired participants. The number of participants in DB plans peaked in 1984 
and has declined slightly in subsequent years. The number of active partici- 
pants, current employees participating in DB plans, peaked in  1981, and has 
declined by  several million since then. In contrast, the number of DC plan 
participants increased throughout the 1980s, although not as quickly as the 
number of  DC plans. This reflects the growth of  relatively small DC plans, 
particularly 401(k) plans, in recent years. 
The last column in table 7.1  tracks contributions to DC and DB  pension 
plans. The disparity between the contribution series is even more dramatic than 
that between the number of participants or the number of plans. DC plan con- 
tributions increased from $23.5 billion in 1980 to $80.1 billion in 1989, with 
$46.1 billion of the 1989  total accounted for by 401(k) contributions. Contribu- 
tions to DB plans, however, peaked at $48.4 billion in 1982, and then declined 
to only $24.9 billion by  1989. The rapid growth in contributions to DC plans 
is largely due to the growth of 401(k) plans. Without them, contributions to 
DC plans would have been only $34 billion in 1989. 
There are at least two reasons why 401(k) plans may have grown faster than 
other DC plans during the 1980s. First, 401(k)s offered tax advantages relative 
to the profit-sharing and thrift plans that they often replaced. The opportunity 
for employees to defer tax on a substantial share of their salary was, and contin- 222  Leslie E. Papke, Mitchell Petersen, and James M. Poterba 
Table 7.1  Trends in Pension Plans, Participants, and Contributions 
Plans  Participants  Contributions 































Defined-Contribution Plans (401 (k)  in parentheses) 
207.7  11.5  12.8 
246.0  13.5 
281.0  15.2 
314.6  16.3 
331.4  18.3 
340.8  19.9 
378.3  21.7 
419.5  24.6 
426.6  (1.7)  29.1  (4.4) 
435.4 (17.3)  32.9  (7.5) 
462.0 (29.9)  35.0 (10.3) 
545.0 (37.4)  36.7 (11.6) 
570.0 (45.1)  38.3 (13.1) 
584.0 (68.1)  37.0 (15.5) 
599.0 (83.3)  36.5 (17.3) 
Defined-Benef t Plans 
103.3  33.0 
114.0  34.2 
121.7  35.0 
128.4  36.1 
139.5  36.8 
148.1  38.0 
167.3  38.9 
175.0  38.6 
175.1  40.0 
168.0  41.0 
170.2  39.7 
172.6  40.0 
163.1  40.0 
146.0  40.7 






























Source: Data are drawn from US. Department of  Labor (1993). 
ues to be, an important attraction of  these plans. Second, 401(k)s are more 
flexible than many other pension arrangements. Since each eligible employee 
can determine the amount of saving he or she does through the 401(k) plan, 
these plans are likely to be more attractive at firms with heterogeneous work- 
forces. Finally, from the firm’s perspective, 401(k) plans may cost less for a 
given level of employer contribution to the median employee.2  With other DC 
2. The median employee may be critical in determining how the firm’s wage payments adjust to 
the level of employer contribution. Provided there is some trade-off between wages and pension 
benefits from the worker’s perspective, the net cost of an employer pension contribution is smaller 
than the amount of this contribution. 223  Do 401(k) Plans Replace Other Employer-Provided Pensions? 
plans, the employer must contribute on behalf of  all eligible workers. Even 
though participation in 401(k) plans is high, however, not all eligible employ- 
ees participate in these plans. For a given level of employer contribution per 
participating employee, therefore, the firm’s total cost will be lower with a 
401(k) than with other DC plans. 
7.2  Sample Survey Design 
It is not possible to study the substitution  between 401(k) plans, DB pension 
plans, and other DC pension plans using the household-level data sets that 
underlie prior research on 401(k)s and household saving. Household data sets 
such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation and the Current Popu- 
lation Survey (CPS) do not collect sufficiently detailed information on the re- 
spondent’s pension arrangements. In addition, neither of these data sets con- 
tains any information on  the pension arrangements at the respondent’s firm 
before the 401(k) option became a~ailable.~ 
To remedy these data deficiencies, we prepared a new survey instrument and 
mailed it to a subset of U.S. corporations. Our questionnaire draws heavily on 
a General Accounting Office survey in 1987 (see U.S. GAO 1988a, 1988b), 
but includes additional questions on the origins of the 401(k) plan at the survey 
firm, whether it had replaced a previous DB  or DC plan, and the degree of 
overlap between 401(k) and other pension coverage for the firm’s employees. 
We  also queried firms about both the current structure of their 401(k) plan and 
historical attributes of  their plan. This enables us to chart patterns in 401(k) 
participation and contributions conditioning on a firm effect. 
We  obtained addresses for 401(k) plan administrators from IRS form 5500 
data filings for 1987,  the most recent year for which public use data were avail- 
able when we mailed our questionnaires. Given the skewed size distribution of 
401(k) plans, the characteristics of  the average plan may be quite different 
from the plan that is available to the average worker. To achieve some represen- 
tativeness with respect to workers, we  adopted a sampling scheme that as- 
signed a higher sampling probability to larger plans. 
Table 7.2 shows the number of 401(k) plans in the form 5500 database. We 
disaggregate plans by  their number of participants, and show the selection 
probability we used to identify survey recipients as well as our response rate 
to date. We mailed 786 questionnaires.  After a dismal first-round response of 
only 33 surveys, we designed a shorter follow-up survey, which we mailed to 
100 nonrespondents. This was followed with a telephone call to explore the 
status of  the survey and, if  necessary, provide an opportunity for the 401(k) 
administrator to report information by  telephone. This second-stage survey 
3. The Health and Retirement Survey, which will become available for public use in the near 
future, includes more detailed data on pension arrangements. It will therefore be possible to study 
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Table 7.2  Sample Survey Design 
Plan Size  Plans on 1987  Surveys  Usable 
(participants)  Form  5500 Tape  Distributed  Responses 
0-500  7,380  275  (4%)  6 
500-5,000  2,660  266 (10%)  13 
2$00  405  245 (60%)  24 
Total  10,445  786  43 
Source: Authors’ tabulations from survey responses. 
yielded another 10 usable responses. Much of our analysis is therefore based 
on data from 43 firms? 
Our survey response rate is disappointing, and raises important questions 
about the representativeness of the firms in our sample and the generality of 
our results. Our response rate is apparently similar, however, to typical re- 
sponse rates to mail surveys conducted by the Department of Labor. In light of 
the small sample size, the results below should be viewed with caution. 
Table 7.3  reports summary characteristics for the 401(k) plans  that  re- 
sponded to our survey. The overwhelming majority of these plans involve both 
a salary-reduction  component and a company matching rate. This arrangement 
characterizes more than two-thirds of the plans and participants in our sample. 
Table 7.3 also provides information on the distribution  of company matching 
rates for 401(k)s. While 10% of the responding plans do not match employee 
contributions, these plans are smaller than average, and account for only 2% 
of the participants in our survey. Ten percent of the responding plans, repre- 
senting nearly one-third of the participants, match employee contributions  dol- 
lar for dollar. Nearly 90% of the participants in the responding 401(k) plans 
face matching rates of at least 25 cents per dollar contributed. 
These results on matching rates are comparable to those in other surveys of 
401(k) plans. The General Accounting Office (1988a) found that 51% of firms 
with  401(k) plans  match  employee contributions and  that, conditional on 
matching, more than two-thirds provided at least a 25% matching contribution. 
A  separate survey by  the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company 
(1991) found that 20% of plans had matching rates of  100% or more, while 
29% had no employer matching. Hewitt Associates’ (1991) survey found that 
84% of 401(k) plans provide some level of employer matching funds. 
7.3  4Ol(k) Plans and  Other Pension Arrangements 
One battery of questions on our survey inquired about how and why the 
401(k) plan was established. We asked if the 401(k) plan was a new plan, or if 
4. Four surveys were returned because the 401(k) plan no longer existed, for example, because 
the parent firm had ceased operations. We  also received six responses indicating that the firms did 
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Table 7.3  Summary Statistics and 401(k) Plan Characteristics  (%) 
Simple  Participant-Weighted 
Average  Average 
Features of  401(k) plan 
Salary-reduction  plan 
Thrift plan 
Profit-sharing plan 
Section 125 flexible spending account 
Contribution structure 
Employer contributions  only 
Salary reduction only 
Salary reduction and company matching 
Salary reduction and company discretionary 
Salary reduction, company matching, and 
company discretionary 








































Source: Authors’ tabulation of survey results. 
‘Actual value was 0.46. which was rounded to 0 
it replaced another pension plan. Table 7.4 summarizes the survey responses. 
Forty-five percent of the responding firms, representing 37% of the 401(k) 
participants in our survey, indicated that another pension plan was converted 
to the 401(k).’ 
Two percent of the responding firms (one firm) reported that DB pension 
plans were terminated and replaced with a 401(k). Many more firms reported 
that they converted previous thrift plans or profit-sharing plans to 401(k)s. Our 
findings also suggest that at least half of the 401(k) plans did not replace previ- 
ous plans. These results do not support the view that 401(k) contributions are 
simply a relabeling of contributions that were previously directed to other pen- 
sion plans. 
The motivation for converting thrift and profit-sharing plans to 401(k)s, as 
noted above, was that contributions to the former were made on an after-tax 
basis, while 401(k) contributions were made before employee taxes. In addi- 
tion, until TRA86 tightened the limits on both 401(k) Contributions and with- 
5. This estimate is based on the thirty-three responses to our initial “long form” questionnaire. 
We  have confirmed the survey responses for most of  our sample firms by  examining their 5500 
filings.  We find clear evidence for some firms that one or several DC  plans were either terminated 
or ceased receiving contributions  when the 401(k) plan was established. 226  Leslie E. Papke, Mitchell Petersen, and James M. Poterba 
Table 7.4  401(k) Plan Initiation Decisions (%) 
Simple  Participant-  Weighted 
Average  Average 






Type of plan converted“ 
Thri  Wsaving 
Profit-sharing 
Other 
Supplement primary defined-contribution plan 
Supplement primary defined-benefit plan 





















Replace primary defined-contribution plan  9  6 
Replace primary defined-benefit pIan  2  17 
Optional tax-deferred saving plan  58 
26  Is the 401(k) the primary retirement plan? (% yes) 
Percentage of 401(k) eligibles also covered by 
Defined-benefit plan 
1986  85 
1990  73 
1986  37 
1990  36 
Percentage of 401(k) eligibles for whom the 
401(k) is the only retirement plan 
Defined-contribution plan 
1986  5 









Source: Authors’ tabulations from survey responses. 
aQuestions  that were not asked on the second-round survey; tabulations are based on thirty-three 
rather than forty-three responses. 
drawals, 401  (k)s offered a highly liquid and tax-favored means to accumulate 
assets. The limit on 401(k) contributions was $30,000 per year until 1986, and 
with federal marginal tax rates of 50% on high-income individuals, the incen- 
tive to defer income and accumulate savings at the pretax rate of return was 
substantial. 
The survey responses indicate that 40 1  (k)s are typically supplemental  plans, 
added to preexisting DB (63%) or DC (19%) plans. A direct test of whether 
40 1  (k) plans have replaced all other pension coverage is provided by our ques- 
tion on the fraction of 401(k) eligible workers who are also covered by  other 
pension arrangements at the firm. In 1990, 82% of the participants in 401(k) 
plans were also covered by  another DB plan at the same firm, and 30% were 
also covered by  another DC plan. These responses are not exclusive: 401(k) 227  Do 40 l(k) Plans Replace Other Employer-Provided Pensions? 
eligibles could be covered by  both. The 401(k) was the only retirement plan 
for covered workers at 19% of the plans, representing 10% of the participants. 
The survey findings on the extent of sole pension coverage by 401(k) plans 
can be compared with information based on published tabulations from the 
IRS form 5500 filings. For 1989,  the most recent year for which data are avail- 
able, the Department of Labor (1993) reports that 14% of the assetsof 401(k) 
plans with at least one hundred employees were held in plans that were the 
only employer-sponsored pension plan for employees.6  This suggests that, at 
most, a small fraction of current 401(k) plans could possibly have displaced 
all other pension arrangements at providing firms. 
There is some indication that the pattern of pension plan coverage for 401(k) 
participants has been changing. Between 1986 and 1990, the share of 401(k) 
participants covered by another DB plan fell from 88% to 82%, and the share 
covered by  another DC plan fell from 32% to 30%.’  The fraction of 401(k) 
plans that represented the only pension coverage for participants rose during 
this period, but this increase was concentrated among smaller plans. 
The disparity between the results in the first and second columns of table 
7.4 suggests important differences between the roles played by 401(k) plans at 
large and small firms. Small firms are more likely to rely on 401(k)s as their 
primary retirement vehicle. The diffusion of 401(k)s across firms during the 
1980s began with large firms; recent adopters are, on average, smaller than 
those with established plans. 
The differences between large and small firms are apparent even in our small 
sample. The 401(k) was the only retirement plan for 14% of  the workers at 
firms that started their 401(k) plans in 1986 or later, compared with only 7% 
of the workers at firms with plans that started before 1986. While 18% of the 
plans that began before 1986 are primary retirement plans, 40% of the post- 
1986 plans are primary plans. 
The foregoing results suggest that only a small minority of  firms replaced 
DB pension plans with 401(k) plans. Only one of our sample respondents, but 
a relatively large firm, indicated that this was the origin of  the 401(k) plan. 
There is more evidence, although it applies at less than half of the firms with 
401(k)s, that these plans replaced previous DC thrift plans. Estimating the size 
of the thrift-plan contribution flow that was redirected to 401(k)s requires more 
detailed information on these plans than our survey collected. 
7.4  401(k) Plan Characteristics  and Participation Rates 
One of the central questions about 401(k) plans, as well as other types of 
tax-deferred retirement saving programs, is the sensitivity  of plan contributions 
6. The 401(k) plans with at least one hundred participants accounted for $41.5  billion of the 
7. With our current  sample size, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the percentage of 
$46.1 billion of 401(k) contributions in 1989. 
401(k) eligibles covered by other plans was the same in 1986 and 1990. 228  Leslie E.  Papke, Mitchell Petersen, and James  M. Poterba 
to tax and other incentives. One strategy for analyzing this question is to com- 
pare the participation rates in 401(k)s with different employer matching rates. 
While the matching rate may be endogenous, it is not clear why one would 
expect a high matching rate as opposed to a high employer contribution at 
firms where large pools of  workers want to participate in a 401(k).8 In this 
case, the correlation between matching rates and participation rates may reflect 
firm decisions rather than employee decisions regarding the amount to save 
through the 401(k). 
One unique feature of our data set is the presence of repeated observations 
on employee participation rates, as well as some aspects of  the 401(k) plan 
such as the matching rate. This permits us to study the persistence of participa- 
tion and contribution rates, as well as the intertemporal stability of employer 
matching rates. 
Table 7.5 summarizes  the joint distribution of the employer matching rate in 
1986 and 1990. We present these data in a transition matrix, showing the pat- 
tern of matching rates in both  1986 and  1990. The table shows that there is 
very strong persistence in the matching rates that firms apply to employee con- 
tributions. Eighty-six percent of the firms responding to our survey applied the 
same matching rate in 1986 and 1990, and the relatively small number that did 
not changed relatively little. With one exception, the set of firms with zero 
matching rates in both years, this fraction is relatively insensitive to the choice 
between plan and participant weighting, as the similarity between the upper 
and lower panels of the table suggests. 
Table 7.6 uses a format similar to table 7.5 to report information on em- 
ployee participation rates in 401(k) plans in both 1986 and 1990. This table 
again suggests important stability. We divide firms into four participation-rate 
groups, and 78% of the plans are in the same group in 1986 and 1990. Larger 
plans are more likely than smaller firms to exhibit high participation rates, but 
they exhibit the same degree of stability as smaller firms. The panel B of table 
7.6, which weights participation rates by  plan size, shows that 90% of the 
401(k) participants in 1990 were in plans with participation rates of 75% or 
more. In contrast, only 65% of the plans have participation rates this high. The 
distribution of  participation rates provides a check on the representativeness 
of  our sample. Weighting firms by  their number of participants, the average 
participation rate is approximately 76%. Tabulations from the 1991 CPS re- 
ported in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) suggest an average participation rate 
of 7 1  %. Papke (1995) also finds similar participation rates in tabulations of the 
1989 IRS form 5500 filings. 
The strong persistence of participation rates across firms suggests, but does 
not prove, that employees do not alter their 401(k) status with any frequency. 
8. Further analysis of participation  decisions,  recognizing the  potential endogeneity of the 
matching rate, would require a more extensive data set with information on firm and worker char- 
acteristics, possibly from a time period before the growth of 401  (k)s. 229  Do 40 l(k) Plans Replace Other Employer-Provided Pensions? 
Table 7.5  Distribution of Employer Matching Rates,  1986 and 1990 (%) 
A. Distribution of  Plans 
1990 Matching Rate 
1986 Matching Rate  0  0.01-0.25  0.26-0.50  0.51-0.75  0.76-0.99  >0.99 
0  12  0  0  0  0  0 
0.01-0.25  0  9  0  0  0  0 
0.26-0.50  0  0  38  15  0  0 
0.51-0.75  0  0  0  12  0  0 
0.76-0.99  0  0  0  0  0  0 
>0.99  0  0  0  0  0  15 
B. Distribution of  Plan Participants 
1990 Matching Rate 
1986 Matching Rate  0  0.01-0.25  0.26-0.50  0.51-0.75  0.76-0.99  >0.99 
0  2  0  0  0  0  0 
0.01-0.2s  0  4  0  0  0  0 
0.26-0.50  0  0  36  13  0  0 
0.51-0.75  0  0  0  8  0  0 
0.76-0.99  0  0  0  0  0  0 
>0.99  0  0  0  0  0  37 
Source: Authors’ tabulations from survey responses. 
Table 7.6  Distribution of Employee Participation Rates, 1986 and 1990 (%) 
A. Distribution of Plans 
1990 Participation Rate 





4  0  0  0 
0  9  4  0 
0  0  17  17 
0  0  0  48 
B. Distribution of Participants 
1990 Participation Rate 
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Unfortunately, data on firm-level participation rates are not ideal for measuring 
the persistence of contributor behavior. One difficulty is that an individual can 
be a plan participant in a given year without making a contribution in that year. 
A second, and more difficult, problem, is that it is possible thatjrm participa- 
tion rates are stable even though individual participation decisions are not. For 
example, a firm could display a 60% participation  rate in two consecutive years 
if 40% of the workers participated in the first but not the second year, a separate 
40% of the workers participated in the second year but not the first, and only 
20% of workers participated in both years. Evidence against this possibility is 
presented in Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1994). That study analyzes individ- 
ual contribution data from one large 401(k) plan, and finds that contribution 
decisions are extremely persistent from one year to the next. This supports the 
view that deciding to contribute to a 401(k) plan is a form of self-control (see 
Shefrin and "haler  1988) and that these contributions are effectively removed 
from the household's disposable income. 
The information we have collected can be used to study how participation 
decisions are affected by employer matching rates. An ordinary least squares 
regression of plan participation rates in 1986 and 1990 on employer matching 
rates and an indicator variable for 1990 yields 
PART =  .602 +  .187*MATCH - .008*DUM90. 
(.058)  (.070)  (.055) 
The R2 for this equation is .124. A  10-percentage-point  increase in  the em- 
ployer matching rate is predicted to raise the participation rate by  almost 2 
percentage points. The point estimate for the 1986 cross-section is somewhat 
smaller (1.6 percentage points, with a standard error of 1.3 points). We  have 
also replaced the level of the matching rate with a sequence of indicator vari- 
ables corresponding to matching rates of zero, 0.01-0.25,  0.26-0.50,  and so 
forth. The estimates from such an equation show that moving from a matching 
rate of zero to one between 0.01 and 0.25 is associated with an increase in the 
participation rate of  15%.  While higher matching-rate categories have higher 
participation rates still, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that participation 
rates at all matching rates above zero are the same. 
Previous research on the association between matching rates and 401(k) par- 
ticipation and  contribution decisions has  generated mixed  results. Papke 
(1995) analyzes plan-level data from IRS form 5500 filings, and finds that the 
effect of changes in the matching rate on the contribution rate is dependent on 
the level of the matching rate. At low levels of  matching, increases in the 
matching rate appear to raise the share of salary contributed, although at high 
matching rates, there appears to be a negative effect. Andrews (1992) studies 
data from the May 1988 CPS, which includes information on whether an indi- 
vidual contributes to a 401(k), what fraction of  salary is contributed, and 
whether or not the plan includes corporate matching. The CPS does not include 
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ship between participation and the presence of matching, but a negative rela- 
tionship between the contribution rate and the matching rate. 
Our survey data include two observations for most firms, so we can difseer- 
ence the matching rates and participation  rates for the firms, allowing for unob- 
served plan effects. The resulting estimate is .139 (.116), suggesting that the 
effect of employer matching on the participation decision is not just the result 
of interplan heter~geneity.~  This finding of  a positive, but statistically weak, 
effect of changes in matching rates on changes in participation contrasts with 
the evidence for a single 401(k) plan in Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1994). 
The study finds relatively little behavioral response to changes in employer 
matching rates. 
Table 7.7  explores another aspect of 401(k) plan structure: where partici- 
pants invest their assets. Most plans allow participants at least three investment 
options, including a stock fund, a bond fund, and a money-market fund. The 
table shows that 401(k) investors hold roughly half of their total assets in equi- 
ties, with about 40% of the equity portfolio in company stock. The most com- 
mon investment vehicles are guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), followed 
by common stock funds. The estimated portfolio shares are probably measured 
with some error, given our small sample size. They can be compared to Van- 
Derhei’s (1992) tabulations of  aggregate 401  (k) portfolio shares, based on 
1989 form 5500 data. Those tabulations show that common stock accounts for 
21% of  the asset value in 401(k) accounts, while GICs account for 41% of 
asset holdings. Part of the difference between these results may be due to a 
shift away from GICs as the prospective returns on these investment vehicles 
has declined. 
One of the central differences between 401(k) plans and traditional DB pen- 
sion plans is that investment decisions are made by individual plan participants 
rather than by professional money managers. In more than half of the plans in 
our sample, participants have full control over the investment of both the em- 
ployee and employer component of 401(k) contributions.  In virtually all of the 
remaining plans, employees can self-direct their own contributions. 
Table 7.8 provides information on another important aspect of 401(k) plan 
structure: the availability of hardship withdrawals and loans. A recent survey 
of 401(k) participants by John Hancock Financial Services (1993) suggest that 
many at least consider the possibility of using 401(k) assets for preretirement 
expenses. While 98% of their sample respondents indicated that they planned 
to use their 401(k) as a retirement saving vehicle, 27% suggested that they 
might use the funds for educational expenses, 27% for medical expenses, and 
12% for home purchase. Table 7.8 shows that 87% of the 401(k) participants 
in our survey participate in 401(k)s that allow loans, and that 91% of the plans 
9. Our data set includes information on the employer matching rate as well as the  maximum 
percentage of salary that is eligible for matching. The cross-section data show that firms that match 
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Table 7.7  Financial Assets in 401(k)  Plans, 1990 (%) 
Simple  Participant-Weighted 
Average  Average 
Equity mutual funds  19  30 
Company stock  24  22 
Guaranteed investment contracts  36  29 
Money market funds  7  4 
Bonds (government and other)  7  I 
Other  I  8 
Source: Authors’ tabulation of  results from initial “long form” survey, based on a total of thirty- 
three responses. 
Table 7.8  Loans and Hardship Withdrawal Provisions 
Simple  Participant-Weighted 
Average  Average 
Plans with loan provisions (%) 
Hardship withdrawal provisions (a) 
70 
Employee contributions  92 
87 
91 
Employer contributions  61  69 
Definitions of hardship withdrawal (%) 
Major medical expenses  93  95 
Family education  93  100 
House purchadrenovation  97  100 
Layoff  14  3 
Divorce  10  2 
Immediate unplanned financial need  34  29 
Number of outstanding  loans/participant  0.32  0.14 
Hardship withdrawal claims/participant  0.11  0.04 
Source: Authors’ tabulation of results from initial “long form” survey, based on a total of thirty- 
three responses. 
allow hardship withdrawal of employee contributions. A smaller share of the 
plans, 61%, allow employees to make hardship withdrawals of employer con- 
tributions. 
Table 7.8 also reports information on the types of hardship that qualify for 
withdrawals at various plans. Virtually all of the plans consider medical ex- 
penses, home purchase, and family education as acceptable justifications for 
withdrawal. Many fewer plans consider divorce and layoff  in this category. 
There is some evidence that smaller plans are more generous in their definition 
of hardship withdrawals. One question about 40 1  (k)s that may become increas- 
ingly important in the future is whether the current 401(k) contributors will 
withdraw their funds before retirement, or instead allow the funds to build and 
to support them in old age. Since the buildup of assets in these plans is a recent 
phenomenon, resolving this issue must await further experience with 401  (k)s. 233  Do 40  1  (k) Plans Replace Other Employer-Provided Pensions? 
7.5  Antidiscrimination Rules and 401(k) Plans 
One of the important advantages  of 401(k) plans over traditional DC pension 
plans is that they permit different employees to contribute different amounts to 
the plan. To avoid the possibility that tax-deferred saving plans with employer 
matching could be used to channel additional compensation to selected groups 
of employees, with tax subsidy, Congress has enacted a set of nondiscrimina- 
tion tests that 401(k) plans must satisfy. These regulations restrict the share of 
each year’s contributions to 401(k) plans that can be made by “highly compen- 
sated employees.” Analogous rules apply to DB plans and other types of retire- 
ment and benefit programs. 
Until 1986, the average percentage of  salary deferred by  the highest-paid 
one-third of the participant group could not exceed the greater of (1) 150% of 
the average deferral percentage (ADP) for other eligible employees, or (2) the 
lesser of 250% of ADP for other employees, and the other-employee  ADP plus 
3%. This was known as the “1/3, 2/3 test.”  TRA86 limited the tax deferral 
benefits that highly compensated employees could receive. First, it reduced the 
maximum elective pretax contribution limit from $30,000 to $7,000. Second, 
TRA86 changed the changed the structure of antidiscrimination  provisions and 
added specific 401(k) nondiscrimination tests to the general rules prohibiting 
discrimination in contributions and benefits. 
TRA86 also introduced what became known as “the ADP test.” The test 
required that the ADP deferred by highly compensated employees could not 
be more than (1) 125% of the ADP for all other eligible employees, or (2) the 
lesser of twice the ADP for all other employees, or the ADP for all other em- 
ployees plus two percentage points.’O For example, if  the ADP of the highly 
compensated group is 6%, and the ADP for the non-highly  compensated group 
is 4%, the plan would pass the test because it satisfies the second set of criteria. 
If  the ADP for the highly compensated group were 6.5%, the plan would fail. 
Even though under criteria 2 6.5% is less than twice 4%, it is more than two 
percentage points higher than the ADP for non-highly  compensated workers. 
TRA86 also added a second test, the actual contribution percentage (ACP) 
test, which applies a similar set of restrictions to the combined employee after- 
tax and employer contributions to the plan. 
If a 401(k) plan fails to satisfy either or both of the ADP and ACP tests, the 
firm can either make additional contributions on behalf of  lower-paid employ- 
ees, so-called helper contributions, or restrict contributions  by highly compen- 
sated employees. Helper contributions include qualified, nonelective employer 
contributions and qualified matching contributions. As a result of these con- 
tributions, the stated matching rate in some 401(k) plans is a lower bound on 
10. TFL486 defined highly compensated employees as those who were more than 5% owners, 
officers who earn more than $45,000  per year, employees who earn more than $75,000,  and em- 
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the  effective matching rate for participants outside the highly compensated 
group. 
Table 7.9 provides information on how the antidiscrimination rules affect 
401(k) plans in our sample. The first question we asked was whether the plan 
was forced to limit or return contributions  by high-wage employees. Only 15% 
of the plans responded affirmatively, and only 3% of the participants were at 
these firms. Three percent of the plans reported making additional contribu- 
tions for low-wage employees. 
Parallel evidence on the importance of ADP testing is found in the Massa- 
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance (1991) survey of  401(k) plans. This survey 
found that 81% of plans passed the ADP test without any correction such as 
helper contributions.  The most important difference between plans that passed 
and those that did not initially pass the ADP test was the participation rate of 
non-highly  compensated employees: 70% at firms that passed, 57% at firms 
that required correction. The evidence from the current study, and that from 
the Massachusetts Mutual (1991) survey, contrasts with the findings of an ear- 
lier Buck Consultants (1989) survey, and the Hewitt Associates (1991) survey. 
The former found that, for the 1988 plan year, only 60% of the surveyed plans 
Table 7.9  Antidiscrimination  Rules and 401(k) Plans 
Percentage of  Percentage of 
Plans Sample  Participants Sample 
Plans that returned high-wage employee 
Plans that made additional contributions for 
Plan average employees in low-wage group 
contributions in 1990 
low-wage workers in 1990 
1986 
1990 




Actual deferral percentages 
Low-wage group, 1986 
Low-wage group, 1990 
High-wage group, 1986 
High-wage group, 1990 
All workers, 1986 
All workers, 1990 



























Source: Authors'  tabulation of survey results. 
"Results are based on a total of forty-three responses to both the first- and second-round surveys; 
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passed the ADP test without corrective action, and the Hewitt (1991) survey 
found that 60%  of plans needed some adjustment  to pass the nondiscrimination 
test. While the difference between surveys could reflect changes in the overall 
difficulty of complying with ADP rules through time, this does not appear to 
be a sufficient explanation for the differences.  This issue requires further inves- 
tigation. 
The relative infrequency with which these constraints bind does not imply 
that high- and low-wage employees are contributing equal shares of their com- 
pensation. Table 7.9 shows the actual deferral percentages for workers catego- 
rized in the high- and low-wage groups. The participant weighted-average 
ADP for the high-wage group is 6.8% in 1990, compared with 5.8% for the 
low-wage group. The ratio of these ADPs is very close to the 125% constraint 
value described above. One important issue that our results raise is whether the 
positive “externalities”  received by highly compensated employees when their 
lower-income counterparts contribute to a 401(k) plan are a key factor in the 
drive by employers to encourage widespread participation in 401(k) plans. 
7.6  Conclusion 
This paper reports the preliminary findings from a new survey of firms that 
provide 401(k) plans for their employees. Our results do not support the view 
that 401(k) plans replaced preexisting DB pension plans at firms that adopted 
401(k)s in the mid-1980s. None of the firms in our data sample reported substi- 
tuting a 401(k) plan for a DB plan. Several firms, however, reported replacing 
previous thrift or profit-sharing plans with the 401(k) plan, presumably be- 
cause 40 1  (k)s provided more attractive opportunities for employees to defer 
taxable income. 
Our survey results also provide new evidence on patterns of 401(k) partici- 
pation. We  collected data on 401(k) participation rates in 1986 and 1990, and 
found very little variation in these rates across this four-year period. This pat- 
tern of stability confirms other findings, based on data for individual contribu- 
tors to 401(k) plans, that suggest that 401(k) participants are not making mar- 
ginal decisions of whether to contribute to the plan in a given month, or even 
year, but rather make long-term commitments. We  explore the link between 
corporate matching rates and 401(k) participation rates, and find evidence of a 
statistically significant,  but substantively small, positive relationship. The pre- 
dicted effect of a 50% employer matching rate is only a 10% increase in partic- 
ipation, which suggests that other factors, such as employer encouragement or 
a desire to take advantage of tax-deferral schemes, must explain the high over- 
all participation rate in 401(k) plans. 236  Leslie E. Papke, Mitchell Petersen, and James M.  Poterba 
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Comment  Richard Thaler 
There is a lot for a behavioral economist to like about this paper. First of all, it 
provides new  data, always welcome. Second, it highlights a little-discussed 
feature of 401(k) saving plans, namely, that once people get started they tend 
to keep contributing. I have two sorts of  comments: the first concerning the 
survey methods used, the other regarding the best conceptual framework for 
thinking about the role of 401(k)s. 
Economists are generally reluctant to collect their own data through surveys, 
as the authors of this paper have done. There seem to be two reasons for this. 
First there is what we might call the machine-readable illusion of  validiq.  Most 
economists seem to feel that numbers are not real unless they are on computer 
tape and someone else has taken care of putting them there. So the Panel Sur- 
vey of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the census data are “hard:’  but surveys 
collected personally are “soft.” People who have looked carefully at the PSID 
are likely to conclude that both data sources are a mixed bag, but it is time we 
all agreed that some data is better than none. The second reason why econo- 
mists don’t like to collect their own data is well illustrated by this paper-it  is 
a pain in the neck! These authors exerted a lot of effort to survey firms about 
their pension plans, only to be frustrated by a very low response rate. Those 
economists who might have been tempted to collect their own data will hardly 
find this team’s experience comforting. However, before we give up on surveys 
again, I think it is important to think about why the response rate was so low. 
In this case my main guess is that the survey instrument was simply too long. 
With the benefit of hindsight, I think that more would have been learned from 
the combination of a shorter instrument and a higher response rate. Other po- 
tential surveyors should take note. 
My other comments are about the general question of evaluating programs 
such as 401  (k)s as a vehicle for increasing the rate of private saving. Elsewhere 
(Thaler 1990, 1994) I have stressed that when evaluating a savings program we 
need to take a long-term perspective. It seems ironic to have to make this point, 
since saving is, per se, about the future. However, many authors have continued 
to stress essentially short-run factors when discussing IRAs, 401(k)s, and the 
like. The short-run questions are, where did the money come from? and do 
these programs represent “new” saving? The question I think we need to ad- 
dress is, over the next few decades, will the existence of such programs in- 
crease the rate of capital accumulation by U.S. households? The magnitude of 
the long-run increase in saving is determined by several behavioral factors. In 
the case of 401(k)s I would like to emphasize three phenomena: initiation (how 
Richard Thaler is professor of behavioral science and economics at the  Graduate School of 
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people get started), leakage (does the money stay put), and persistence (do 
people keep putting more money in). 
What determines whether an employee will start contributing to a 401(k) 
plan? Two economic factors are important, and are correctly stressed in this 
paper: taxes and matching. Contributions and accumulations are tax free, cre- 
ating an obvious incentive to participate, and many firms actually match em- 
ployees’ contributions in whole or in part. As Papke, Petersen, and Poterba 
show, employees seem to be sensitive to this matching provision. The higher 
the matching rate, the higher the participation rate. While these factors are 
important, there are also behavioral factors that determine how many employ- 
ees contribute. (1) Peer pressure: if contributing to the 401(k) is considered the 
“smart thing to do,” more employees will do so. A high matching rate undoubt- 
edly helps produce this peer pressure. (2) Salience: firms may engage in drives 
to encourage employees to participate (in part because of the antidiscrimina- 
tion rules). Just as advertising may have helped sell IRAs, a push within the 
firm may also help, especially for lower-income workers who have many press- 
ing demands on their paychecks. (3) Ease of joining: economists think of sav- 
ing as a rational calculation, but we all know that inertia matters in our own 
daily lives. If contributing to a saving plan is made easy, more people will do 
it. Of course this is just reducing a transactions cost, but my point is that elimi- 
nating a seemingly trivial one-time cost, such as going to a bank and setting 
up an IRA account (trivial in comparison to the costs of an underfunded retire- 
ment), may play an important role. (4) Payroll deductions: from a psychologi- 
cal perspective, the least painful way  of  saving money is to have it deducted 
from your paycheck. What you don’t see doesn’t hurt to give up. 
Getting the money into a savings vehicle is just the first step. For people to 
successfully save for retirement, as opposed to next month’s splurge, the money 
has to stay invested. In the life-cycle framework it makes no difference where 
wealth sits. Households simply consume the annuity value of  the wealth in 
every period. However, the evidence suggests that the marginal propensity to 
consume differs across various mental accounts (Shefrin and Thaler 1988). In 
particular, people are much more likely to spend from liquid assets such as 
savings accounts than they  are from money coded as retirement savings, for 
example, IRAs and 401(k)s. (For clear evidence of this, see Gale and Scholz 
1994.) In this sense, 401(k)s are savings repositories that exhibit low leakage. 
The third factor in determining long-term saving is what might be termed 
persistence. Contributing to a pension plan for a year is good, but contributing 
for many years is much better. What we would like to know is something like 
a transition probability: if  a worker contributes to a 401(k) in year t, what is 
the chance that he or she will contribute again in year t + l?  To answer this 
question properly, one needs panel microdata (another survey!). However, the 
data presented here give a strong suggestion that for 401(k)s the persistence 
rate is quite high because the percentage of employees who contribute is re- 
markably stable over time. IRA contributors also appear to display remarkable 239  Do 401(k) Plans Replace Other Employer-Provided Pensions? 
persistence, although this has not been studied carefully either. I believe that 
the issue of persistence of contributions deserves more study. 
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